Q-Cyber Magazine

BFSI · 11 October 2026 · 3 min read

Third-party risk in Indian BFSI: Accountability stays with the regulated entity

RBI's 2026 bank cybersecurity directions and SEBI's CSCRF both treat suppliers as part of the regulated estate, while leaving legal accountability with the bank or market entity, and both now expect cryptographic and software-transparency discipline in those relationships.

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Most Indian banks and market entities now run critical journeys on other people's software, clouds, payment processors and operations centres. The 2024–2026 rulebooks do not forbid that. They forbid the idea that the duty leaves the licence when the work does.

What the two rulebooks agree on

They agree, first, on accountability. A managed SOC, a hosted core, or a vendor application does not become the reporting entity. The bank still files on DAKSH and notifies CERT-In. The market entity still reports on SEBI's incident portal and remains answerable for logs and data. Contracts that are silent on evidence, audit access, and incident clocks are therefore incomplete.

They agree, second, on visibility. SEBI's SBOM rule is explicit: new software for core and critical activities must arrive with a bill of materials, kept current at each upgrade, with a Board-approved exception path only for some legacy or proprietary systems. RBI's baseline includes third-party arrangements and cryptographic controls as named domains. A supplier that cannot describe its components, or its cryptography, is a control gap in both regimes.

They agree, third, on concentration. CSCRF asks entities to assess concentration risk on outsourced agencies in the interest of operational resiliency. A bank or broker that depends on a single provider for a critical path should be able to explain what happens if that provider fails, and to have tested the explanation.

Exhibit 1

Third-party expectations in the current RBI and SEBI texts

TopicRBI commercial-bank directions, 2026SEBI CSCRF, 20 August 2024
AccountabilityThe bank remains the subject of the directions, including six-hour reporting on DAKSH and notice to CERT-InThe RE is solely accountable for CIA, non-repudiation, data and log security, and compliance, including for third-party services
Software transparencyThird-party arrangements and cryptographic controls are baseline Chapter V domainsSBOM required for new software in core and critical activities, updated at each upgrade
Contracts and monitoringBaseline controls are expected to be reflected in the bank's arrangementsContracts must support the cybersecurity and supply-chain plan; critical providers must be monitored; similar information-security standards must be mandated
Resilience testingBusiness continuity, incident response and drills, including with CERT-In and IDRBTResponse and recovery planning and testing shall be conducted with third-party service providers; concentration risk shall be reviewed

Source: RBI Directions, 31 July 2026 (updated 1 October 2026); SEBI circular SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2024/113, 20 August 2024.

Implications

  1. Write accountability, evidence and clocks into every critical-vendor contract.
  2. Require SBOMs and a cryptographic inventory for software that touches core or critical activities.
  3. Test incident response with the supplier, not only in an internal tabletop.
  4. Measure concentration risk and be able to describe a failure of the primary provider.

What this means for BFSI

Outsourcing has not become easier to govern; it has become more clearly governed. The institutions that will stay on the right side of the 2024 and 2026 texts are those that can show, for each critical supplier, what is running, who is accountable, and how an incident will be reported on the statutory clock.

Sources

  1. RBI (Commercial Banks – Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework) Directions, 2026
  2. SEBI CSCRF circular, 20 August 2024