Q-Cyber Magazine

Government · 5 November 2026 · 4 min read

Harvest now, decrypt later: Why long-lived government records cannot wait

Adversaries can record ciphertext today and decrypt it once a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer exists; government records with long confidentiality lives should therefore move first to post-quantum key establishment.

Abstract graphic of a lattice of connected points in Knowlcom blue

The case for starting a post-quantum migration now does not depend on a quantum computer already existing. It depends on how long today's government records must remain confidential.

A collection problem, not a future outage

NIST's October 2026 explanation is precise. Quantum computers are still in development. A sufficiently powerful device would threaten the encryption methods that protect confidential electronic information. Even so, today's encrypted data is already at risk if an adversary can store it until that device arrives. NSA describes the same pattern in three steps: harvest, through compromised servers or traffic interception; store, often for years; and decrypt, once quantum capability is sufficient.

This is why waiting for a public demonstration of a cryptanalytically relevant machine is the wrong trigger. The relevant date is not the day the machine appears. It is today plus the number of years the record must stay secret. If a file must remain confidential for 20 years, and a capable machine might exist inside that window, the file is already in the risk set.

NSA also distinguishes a related problem, "trust now, forge later," which concerns the future breakage of digital signatures and certificates. That risk matters for authenticity. Harvest-now-decrypt-later matters for confidentiality. They should be planned together, but they are not the same work.

Exhibit 1

Which government data should move first

Lower sensitivity
Higher sensitivity
Short confidentiality life (a few years)
Schedule with the general cryptographic refresh
Bring forward, especially if the records will be archived
Long confidentiality life (a decade or more)
Prioritise key-establishment migration (FIPS 203)
First-wave inventory and FIPS 203 deployment; treat as a current operational priority

Source: Framework derived from NIST's advice in the 27 October 2026 IR 8547 announcement to prioritise FIPS 203 for data that is particularly sensitive or needs to be kept secure for a long time; NSA, 'Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Digital Armor,' 1 October 2026.

Reference

Size comparisonPublic keys: classical vs post-quantum
Public keys: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
X25519 public key32 bytes
RSA-2048 public modulus256 bytes
ML-KEM-512 encapsulation key800 bytes
ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key1,184 bytes
ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key1,568 bytes
ML-DSA-65 public key1,952 bytes

ML-KEM ciphertexts are 768, 1,088 and 1,568 bytes for the three parameter sets.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

Size comparisonSignatures: classical vs post-quantum
Signatures: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
Ed2551964 bytes
ECDSA P-25664 bytes
RSA-2048256 bytes
ML-DSA-442,420 bytes
ML-DSA-653,309 bytes
ML-DSA-874,627 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s7,856 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f17,088 bytes

SLH-DSA keeps a 32-byte public key but carries the largest signatures.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

What to do with the records you already hold

A government archive cannot be "re-encrypted in the wild" if the ciphertext has already been copied by someone else. The only protection for traffic already harvested is that the classical algorithm still stands. The protection for traffic not yet harvested is to change the key establishment. That is why NIST points organisations first to FIPS 203, and why a hybrid construction — classical plus post-quantum — is an accepted, more conservative option during the transition.

The practical work is classification, not slogans. Identify systems that exchange or store records with a long confidentiality life: civil registration, tax and welfare, health-adjacent government files, law-enforcement and intelligence holdings, diplomatic and military communications, and legal archives. For each, ask whether the session keys and stored backups still depend on RSA or elliptic-curve key establishment. Those are the first design reviews.

Implications

  1. Date the confidentiality life, not only the system life. A platform retired in 2028 may still hold records that must remain secret until 2045.
  2. Inventory key establishment separately from signatures. Harvest-now-decrypt-later is a confidentiality problem; FIPS 203 is the first standard to apply.
  3. Assume copies may already exist. New protection does not unwind past interception; it stops the accumulation of more vulnerable ciphertext.
  4. Place the work in operations. NIST IR 8547 treats the migration as a current operational priority, beginning with inventories, plans and early deployment of PQC-enabled products.

What this means for government

If a department cannot say which of its holdings must remain confidential for a decade or more, it is not ready to sequence a post-quantum programme. That list, once written, is the migration plan.

Sources

  1. NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
  2. NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
  3. Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Digital Armor (NSA)