Q-Cyber Magazine
India's quantum-safe roadmap: PQC migration deadlines for critical sectors and enterprises
A DST task force under the National Quantum Mission has set India's first post-quantum migration calendar: critical sectors by 31 December 2029 and other enterprises by 31 December 2033, starting with inventories, hybrid pilots and CBOMs.

Until recently, Indian organisations planning their move away from quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography had to borrow deadlines from NIST, the UK or the EU. That changed in May 2026. The Department of Science and Technology published Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India: Roadmap to Quantum Resiliency, the report of a task force constituted under the National Quantum Mission. It sets dates for critical sectors and for every other enterprise.
What the task force decided
The task force was chaired by the chief executive of C-DOT and worked through two sub-groups. The Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC) led a framework for testing and certifying quantum-safe products. The Data Security Council of India (DSCI) led the strategy for migration, quantum resiliency and crypto-agility. The report frames its recommendations as risk containment rather than preparation. Planning is to proceed on an "assume-breach" principle because of harvest-now-decrypt-later, and the report notes that retrospective mitigation is not feasible once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists.
It also takes positions that Indian security leaders should note. It describes post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as the pragmatic and scalable route to quantum resilience. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is suited to a limited set of high-assurance links and, because it provides key establishment but not signatures, must be combined with PQC. Organisations are asked to strengthen symmetric protection as well, for example by moving from AES-128 to AES-256.
Exhibit 1
India's post-quantum milestones at a glance
| Milestone | CII sectors | Other enterprises | What it involves |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Build foundations | 31 December 2027 | 31 December 2028 | Governance, cryptographic inventory, quantum risk assessment, pilots and PQC readiness in procurement |
| 2. Migrate high-priority systems | 31 December 2028 | 31 December 2030 | No new classical-only deployments; PQC-ready PKI, HSMs, KMS and libraries; PQC-capable signatures |
| 3. Full PQC adoption | 31 December 2029 | 31 December 2033 | Enterprise-wide PQC or hybrid use, PQC-only trust chains, vendor oversight and layered risk management for legacy systems |
Source: DST, Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India, May 2026: 'Milestones at a glance' (Annexure C) and section 7.0.
How the Indian dates compare
The Indian calendar is tighter than the main international ones. NIST IR 8547, finalised on 27 October 2026, supports US federal targets of 2030 for key establishment and 2031 for digital signatures in high-value and high-impact systems, with 2035 as the primary completion target. The UK NCSC asks organisations to finish discovery and an initial plan by 2028, priority migrations by 2031 and complete migration by 2035. The EU's coordinated roadmap asks for high-risk use cases to be migrated by the end of 2030, and medium-risk ones by the end of 2035. India's 2029 date for critical sectors is earlier than all of them.
For an Indian organisation that also serves foreign clients, the domestic date will usually govern. A bank, telecom operator or power utility that planned to the US or EU calendar would miss the Indian CII milestone by a year or more.
The Indian building blocks already in place
The roadmap does not start from zero. Three earlier publications supply its working parts.
TEC's technical report. TEC released Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (TEC 910018:2025) in January 2025. It sets out a sequence: awareness and training, governance, risk assessment through a cryptographic inventory, a short-, medium- and long-term roadmap, implementation and testing. For timing it recommends the Mosca model: if the years data must stay secure plus the years needed to migrate exceed the years until a capable quantum computer exists, the data is at risk. It also describes hybrid key establishment and hybrid signatures as the way to manage trust during the transition.
CERT-In's bill-of-materials guidelines. Version 2.0 of CERT-In's Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, dated 9 July 2025, defines a CBOM as an inventory of cryptographic assets: algorithms, keys, protocols, certificates and dependencies. It recommends that government, public-sector and essential-services organisations require a CBOM in related procurements, developments and integrations, and that suppliers provide one.
Global algorithm standards. NIST's FIPS 203, 204 and 205, approved on 13 August 2024, specify ML-KEM for key establishment and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for signatures. The DST report calls for progressive adoption of indigenously developed quantum-safe products while keeping interoperability with global standards.
A practical sequence for the next four quarters
For a CII operator, Milestone 1 falls due in about 13 months; for other enterprises, in about 25. Either way, the first year's work is the same.
- Name an owner and a persona. The report groups organisations as urgent adopters, regular adopters, and technology providers and enablers. Where more than one applies, the highest-risk persona sets the priorities. Record which applies, and why.
- Build the CBOM. Inventory public-key cryptography across applications, protocols, certificates, HSMs and key stores, including suppliers who embed cryptography you never configured. Use a standard machine-readable format so that the inventory can be refreshed rather than rewritten.
- Rank by confidentiality life. Record how long each data set must stay secret, not only how long the system will run. Long-lived data moves first, which points to FIPS 203 key establishment.
- Pilot hybrid key establishment. The task force asks for PQC or hybrid sandbox pilots in high-priority systems. Start where traffic carries long-lived data: inter-office links, VPNs, secure messaging and file exchange.
- Change procurement now. The report recommends common requirements across government RFPs for crypto-agile, PQC-compliant assets with a compulsory bill of materials, and CBOM submissions from vendors from FY 2027–28. Private buyers can adopt the same clauses today.
- Plan the PKI. Milestone 2 calls for PQC-ready PKI, HSMs, KMS and libraries. These have the longest lead times, so budgets and vendor road maps belong in this year's plan.
Testing, certification and what is still pending
The report proposes a National PQC Testing and Certification Programme under TEC, STQC and BIS, with Tier-1 and Tier-2 laboratories operational by December 2026. An interim approval mechanism will apply while the framework is built, which the report expects to take 12 to 18 months. It also asks for an Indian list of cryptography-dependent product categories. The list is to draw on CISA's January 2026 list, add mobile phones and automated cryptographic discovery and inventory tools, and be communicated to vendors as a future compliance requirement.
Several elements are recommendations, not yet rules. The task force asked that the report be sent to ministries and to regulators such as RBI, SEBI and CERC so that they can issue sector-specific guidance. Until that guidance appears, the dates are a national planning baseline. They are also the dates regulators are most likely to adopt, and prudent organisations will plan to them now.
Implications
- Plan to the Indian date. For CII sectors that is 2029, earlier than the US, UK or EU targets.
- Make the inventory the first deliverable. Milestone 1 cannot be shown without a CBOM and a quantum risk assessment.
- Write agility into contracts. Procurement will move before sector regulators do.
- Use hybrid as the bridge. Indian and international guidance both accept classical-plus-PQC constructions during the transition.
What this means for government and enterprise
India's roadmap turns post-quantum migration from a research topic into a dated programme. Q-Ready, one of Knowlcom's applications, builds the cryptographic inventory and a gated migration plan without data leaving the organisation's network, and its deadline profiles include the Indian 2029 and 2033 horizons. The decisive work is organisational: an owner, an inventory and a first-wave list, in place well before the end of 2027.
Sources
- DST, Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India: Roadmap to Quantum Resiliency (May 2026)
- DSCI, Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India (13 May 2026)
- TEC 910018:2025, Technical Report on Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography
- CERT-In, Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, Version 2.0 (9 July 2025)
- NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 announcement (13 August 2024)
- NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (27 October 2026)
- NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
- European Commission, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (23 June 2025)


