Q-Cyber Magazine

Deep-science R&D · 4 November 2026 · 4 min read

Quantum computing realities and the cryptographic clock

A cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer has not been demonstrated, but NIST still treats the cryptographic transition as urgent because of harvest-now-decrypt-later and because previous algorithm migrations have often taken 10 to 20 years.

Abstract graphic of a lattice of connected points in Knowlcom blue

Two facts need to be held at once. Quantum computers capable of breaking widely used public-key algorithms have not been shown to exist. And the migration away from those algorithms is, on the published evidence, already a current operational task.

What is known, and what is not

NIST's public language is measured. Quantum computers may be years or decades away, but they could eventually break many of today's widely used cryptographic systems. The agency has therefore already issued FIPS 203, 204 and 205, and has told organisations to begin applying them. That is not a prediction of a date on which a cryptographically relevant machine will appear. NIST has not published such a date in the materials cited here, and this article will not invent one.

The urgency has a different basis. Encrypted data collected today can be stored until such a machine exists. Records with a long confidentiality life are already in that risk set. Separately, cryptographic transitions are slow. If a transition typically takes a decade or two, a completion target in 2035, with earlier dates for high-value systems, leaves little slack. Those two observations — stored ciphertext, and slow replacement — are sufficient to justify work now.

India's research programme sits beside this, not in contradiction to it. The National Quantum Mission is a serious, funded attempt to build computing, communication, sensing and materials capacity by 2030-31. Its computing target is stated in physical qubits, on named platforms. Error-corrected, cryptanalytically relevant machines are a different and higher bar. Research progress should be watched. It should not be used to claim that classical public-key cryptography is already finished, or that it can safely be ignored.

Exhibit 1

Two clocks that should not be collapsed into one

What is officially stated
What should not be inferred
Cryptographic migration (NIST path)
FIPS 203, 204 and 205 are approved; harvest-now-decrypt-later makes delay costly; high-value federal key establishment by end-2030, signatures by end-2031, broader target 2035; historical transitions often 10-20 years
A public date on which a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer will arrive
National research capacity (India NQM)
Rs 6,003.65 crore from 2023-24 to 2030-31; target of 50-1,000 physical qubits in eight years; 2,000 km quantum communication and QKD goals
That those physical-qubit targets are equivalent to a machine that can break RSA or elliptic-curve cryptography

Source: Qualitative comparison of official statements in NIST's 27 October 2026 announcement and IR 8547, and the Cabinet's 19 April 2023 National Quantum Mission release. No unpublished forecasts are added.

Reference

Size comparisonPublic keys: classical vs post-quantum
Public keys: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
X25519 public key32 bytes
RSA-2048 public modulus256 bytes
ML-KEM-512 encapsulation key800 bytes
ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key1,184 bytes
ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key1,568 bytes
ML-DSA-65 public key1,952 bytes

ML-KEM ciphertexts are 768, 1,088 and 1,568 bytes for the three parameter sets.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

Size comparisonSignatures: classical vs post-quantum
Signatures: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
Ed2551964 bytes
ECDSA P-25664 bytes
RSA-2048256 bytes
ML-DSA-442,420 bytes
ML-DSA-653,309 bytes
ML-DSA-874,627 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s7,856 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f17,088 bytes

SLH-DSA keeps a 32-byte public key but carries the largest signatures.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

A researcher's and an engineer's division of labour

Deep-science programmes should pursue the Mission's published goals, including emulation and algorithm research that helps the country understand both the promise and the limits of near-term devices. Security engineers should, in parallel, inventory public-key cryptography and plan FIPS 203, 204 and 205 adoption. The two efforts inform each other. Neither excuses the other.

Emulation of quantum systems on classical machines, which is part of the wider scientific toolkit, is useful for algorithm study. It is not a substitute for post-quantum algorithms on production networks.

Implications

  1. Speak precisely. Distinguish physical qubits, logical qubits and a cryptanalytically relevant capability.
  2. Do not wait for a demonstration date that official sources have not given.
  3. Start the cryptographic inventory now, because stored ciphertext and slow transitions are already established reasons.
  4. Support national research without postponing PQC engineering.

What this means for deep-science R&D

The scientific programme is real, funded and dated. The cryptographic risk is real and already being standardised against. Laboratories and firms that can keep those statements distinct will serve both science and security better than those who collapse them into either panic or complacency.

Sources

  1. NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
  2. NIST IR 8547
  3. NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project
  4. Cabinet approval of the National Quantum Mission