Q-Cyber Magazine
Defence software supply chains need more than a vendor letter
The 2026 SBOM minimum elements, co-authored by CERT-In, and CERT-In's own space-sector supply-chain guidance give defence buyers a public standard for provenance, firmware and component transparency.

A defence system is a composition of other people's software, firmware and tools. If that composition is invisible, then so is the attack surface that arrives with the next widely exploited component.
Provenance is a mission control
Defence acquisition has long asked suppliers for assurances. The 2026 SBOM baseline turns a subset of those assurances into data that can be issued, signed, ingested and compared when an advisory is published. That is the operational difference between a letter and an ingredients list.
The document is explicit that the minimum elements apply to all software, and that some classes — including artificial-intelligence systems — may need additional fields. It also notes that CERT-In has published technical guidelines on bills of materials. For Indian defence programmes, the national CSIRT is not a distant commentator; it is a co-author of the international minimum and the author of domestic BOM guidance.
Firmware belongs in the same conversation. CERT-In's space framework lists firmware manipulation among its illustrated threats, and it asks operators to test for tampering and to require secure update channels. A software bill of materials that stops at the application layer, and is silent on bootloaders, radios and ground-station controllers, is incomplete for the systems defence actually fields.
Exhibit 1
What a defence buyer should now be able to see
| Question | 2026 SBOM minimum element or CERT-In space guidance | Why it matters in a defence programme |
|---|---|---|
| Who produced this component? | Component producer; unknown must be stated | Identifies origin and highlights gaps in provenance |
| Which version is running? | Component version; unknown must be stated | Links the estate to advisories and patches |
| What does it depend on? | Component dependency relationship | Reveals transitive risk, not only first-tier vendors |
| Is the inventory authentic? | SBOM author signature | Reduces the chance of a fabricated ingredients list |
| Has firmware been considered? | CERT-In: test for firmware tampering; secure update channels; HBOM as applicable | Many operational systems fail at the firmware and hardware layer first |
Source: CISA and partners, 2026 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials, 29 July 2026; CERT-In space and SatCom framework, February 2026, section 5.8.
Contract language, not slogans
The useful contractual move is to name the 2026 minimum elements, require a machine-processable and signed SBOM at delivery and at each material update, and require correlation with security advisories during the support period. Where the system includes firmware, radio stacks or machine-learning components, the contract should also call for the relevant CERT-In bill-of-materials class, rather than stretching a single software list past its purpose.
None of this replaces other assurance activities. It makes those activities pointed. Vulnerability management, acceptance testing and in-service exploitation analysis all improve when the component list is complete and current.
Implications
- Put the 2026 minimum elements in statements of work, including signature and explicit unknowns.
- Cover firmware and hardware, not only application software, using CERT-In's wider BOM guidance where it applies.
- Use the artefact in service, not only at commissioning.
- Treat AI-enabled subsystems as a special case that starts with the minimum elements and then adds fields.
What this means for defence
A programme office that cannot list the components in a fielded system cannot claim to be managing their risk. The July 2026 minimum elements and CERT-In's supply-chain language are now public enough to be used in the next negotiation, not deferred to a later policy review.


