Q-Cyber Magazine
Trust now, forge later: Defence authentication in the quantum transition
NSA's 'trust now, forge later' problem is the authenticity counterpart to harvest-now-decrypt-later: today's signatures and certificates must still be trustworthy when quantum-vulnerable algorithms fail.

Confidentiality gets most of the attention in post-quantum discussion. Defence also depends on a quieter property: the ability to know that an order, a software update or a device identity is genuine.
Authenticity has a half-life too
NSA's October 2026 account is straightforward. Modern systems use cryptographic algorithms to establish trust and to authenticate users and devices. Some of those algorithms, based on integer factorisation or discrete logarithms, are vulnerable to a future cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer. Once that capability exists, the mathematics that now protects authentication will no longer do so. The agency's name for the resulting pattern is "trust now, forge later."
This is distinct from harvest-now-decrypt-later. A recorded ciphertext can be opened later without any change to the original message. A forged signature, by contrast, is an integrity and identity failure: a software update that looks signed, a device that looks enrolled, a command that looks authorised. The two risks share a cause, but they demand different inventories.
NIST has already provided the replacement standards. FIPS 204 specifies a module-lattice digital signature scheme derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium. FIPS 205 specifies a stateless hash-based scheme derived from SPHINCS+. NIST has also said it is developing a FIPS derived from Falcon as a further alternative, and that ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, with ML-KEM, should be put into use now as the foundation of most deployments.
Exhibit 1
Two quantum-era risks, two first standards
| Risk | What fails | First-line NIST standard | Federal high-value system marker (NIST IR 8547 path) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvest now, decrypt later | Confidentiality of recorded ciphertext | FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment | 31 December 2030 |
| Trust now, forge later | Authenticity of signatures, certificates and identities | FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) | 31 December 2031 |
Source: NSA, Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Digital Armor, 1 October 2026; NIST FIPS announcement, 13 August 2024; NIST IR 8547 announcement, 27 October 2026.
Reference
Where defence actually signs
The signature estate in a defence organisation is wider than e-mail. It includes certificate authorities, device enrolment, software and firmware signing, document authentication, and any protocol that binds a command to an identity. A migration that upgrades a few user certificates and leaves firmware signing on a vulnerable algorithm has not addressed the trust-now-forge-later problem.
The later date for signatures in the federal high-value path — the end of 2031, after key establishment in 2030 — should not be read as permission to delay the inventory. It reflects a sequencing of effort, not a judgement that authenticity is secondary. Certificate hierarchies and embedded signers often take longer to replace than session-key establishment, which is an argument for starting earlier, not later.
Implications
- Catalogue every signing purpose, including firmware, devices and commands, not only user certificates.
- Plan FIPS 204 and 205 adoption alongside FIPS 203, with hybrid or dual-signature designs where they reduce risk during transition.
- Protect the issuers. A post-quantum leaf certificate under a vulnerable certificate authority is a delayed failure.
- Rehearse revocation and re-enrolment. Forgery risk is also an incident-response problem.
What this means for defence
If a service cannot list the algorithms that underwrite its software updates and its device identities, it cannot yet claim a post-quantum plan. Encryption and authentication have to move together, on a published standard, before the old mathematics expires.


