Q-Cyber Magazine

Defence · 7 November 2026 · 3 min read

Post-quantum cryptography for defence systems

Defence communications and long-lived operational records face the same quantum-era mathematics as civil systems, but with tighter confidentiality lives and a clearer vendor signal from CNSA 2.0 and NIST IR 8547.

Abstract graphic of a lattice of connected points in Knowlcom blue

Defence organisations do not need a new argument for cryptographic discipline. They need a dated plan for replacing public-key algorithms that a future quantum computer could break, starting with the traffic an adversary would most want to store today.

Two clocks, one inventory

There are now two published clocks that matter to defence planners, even where the legal instruments are American. The first is NIST's civil-and-federal path: high-value and high-impact federal systems are to migrate key establishment by the end of 2030 and digital signatures by the end of 2031, with 2035 as the primary completion target and the point at which quantum-vulnerable algorithms are to leave NIST standards. The second is NSA's national-security path: CNSA 2.0 support in new commercial National Security Systems by 2027, and a phase-out of legacy systems by 2030.

Indian defence programmes are not subjects of those instruments. They are, however, buyers in a market that will be reshaped by them. Radios, command-and-control software, satellite ground equipment, hardware security modules and protocol stacks will be designed, certified and withdrawn on vendor road maps that follow these dates. A programme that cannot say which of its fielded systems can take FIPS 203 or a CNSA 2.0 profile, and which cannot, is already late against a 2027–2030 refresh.

Exhibit 1

Published civil and national-security PQC milestones

  1. 13 August 2024

    FIPS 203, 204 and 205 approved as principal PQC standards

  2. 2027

    NSA: new commercial National Security Systems to support CNSA 2.0

  3. 2030

    NSA: legacy systems that cannot support CNSA 2.0 to be phased out; NIST: end-2030 key-establishment target for federal high-value and high-impact systems

  4. 31 December 2031

    NIST path: PQC digital signatures on federal high-value and high-impact systems

  5. 2035

    Primary federal completion target; quantum-vulnerable algorithms removed from NIST standards

Source: NIST FIPS announcement, 13 August 2024; NIST IR 8547 announcement, 27 October 2026; NSA, 'Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Digital Armor,' 1 October 2026.

Reference

Size comparisonPublic keys: classical vs post-quantum
Public keys: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
X25519 public key32 bytes
RSA-2048 public modulus256 bytes
ML-KEM-512 encapsulation key800 bytes
ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key1,184 bytes
ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key1,568 bytes
ML-DSA-65 public key1,952 bytes

ML-KEM ciphertexts are 768, 1,088 and 1,568 bytes for the three parameter sets.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

Size comparisonSignatures: classical vs post-quantum
Signatures: classical vs post-quantum, in bytes
AlgorithmBarSize (bytes)
Ed2551964 bytes
ECDSA P-25664 bytes
RSA-2048256 bytes
ML-DSA-442,420 bytes
ML-DSA-653,309 bytes
ML-DSA-874,627 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s7,856 bytes
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f17,088 bytes

SLH-DSA keeps a 32-byte public key but carries the largest signatures.

Sources NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), FIPS 186-5 (ECDSA); RFC 7748 (X25519); RFC 8032 (Ed25519).

What defence should migrate first

NSA separates two threats. Harvest now, decrypt later targets confidentiality: recorded ciphertext is stored until it can be opened. Trust now, forge later targets authenticity: signatures and certificates that underwrite identity and software integrity. Defence systems carry both. Mission traffic, imagery, orders and design data need confidentiality that lasts. Software updates, device identity and chain-of-command authentication need signatures that will still be trustworthy.

NIST advises organisations to prioritise FIPS 203 for data that is particularly sensitive or long-lived, and it accepts hybrid classical-plus-post-quantum constructions as a more conservative interim. That advice maps cleanly onto defence procurement: require cryptographic agility in new systems, refuse designs that hard-code a single public-key algorithm, and sequence field upgrades by the confidentiality life of the traffic they carry.

Implications

  1. Build a classified-appropriate inventory of public-key use in radios, networks, platforms, ground segments and supply-chain signing.
  2. Use the 2027 and 2030 markers as vendor management dates, even where the legal instruments do not formally apply.
  3. Lead with key establishment for long-lived operational records; follow with signature and certificate infrastructure.
  4. Treat hybrid modes as a bridge, not as a way to avoid choosing a post-quantum standard.

What this means for defence

The standards are published. The remaining work is inventory, agility and fielding. A service that starts with the systems whose traffic would be most valuable if stored for a decade will be making the only prioritisation that the published guidance supports.

Sources

  1. Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Digital Armor (NSA)
  2. NIST Report Provides Guidelines for Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
  3. NIST IR 8547
  4. NIST announcement of FIPS 203, 204 and 205