Q-Cyber Magazine · Incident report
Sabotage of internet-exposed refrigeration controllers: about 700 French retail sites hit in one night
In the night of 11 to 12 October 2026, attackers changed the defrost settings of refrigeration controllers reachable from the internet at about 700 retail sites in France. France has attributed the attack to a unit of Iran's IRGC.

Paris, 23 November 2026. In the night of Sunday 11 to Monday 12 October 2026, attackers took control of refrigeration controllers whose management interfaces were reachable from the internet and changed their defrost settings to high temperatures. According to the French government's interagency cyber crisis coordination centre (C4), about 700 retail sites in France were affected, with significant losses of goods and, in at least 15 cases, fires breaking out. On 9 November France attributed the attack to Iran, describing it as the first cyber-offensive campaign carried out purely for sabotage on French territory.
What happened
According to the C4 report published by CERT-FR on 9 November, the C4 was alerted on 12 October to an attack on the refrigeration controllers of about 700 sites in French food retail. After the controllers were compromised overnight, their defrost parameters were set to high temperatures. The affected organisations were mainly large retail groups; the C4 is also aware of other victims in the food sector, including several small butchers, an abattoir and cooperative food-processing plants.
Vendor notices describe the same effects. Danfoss told customers on 13 October that several French sites had reported suspicious changes in the early hours of 12 October, including unusually high defrost temperatures, changed temperature settings and activation of electrical defrost. As reported by AEF Info, the Paris prosecutor said the attackers took remote control of the equipment through web interfaces to start abnormal, unlimited defrost cycles while disabling the probe alerts that should trigger above a set temperature. The prosecutor put the number of fires at about 20.
The C4 also linked to the same attack the concurrent targeting of equipment at several small hydroelectric installations in France, with moderate effects.
The products, and what the advisories say
The products were the target. This section reports only what the national and manufacturer advisories state about them.
CERT-FR names the four product lines and states that exposing a management interface on the internet is contrary to good practice. It warns that keeping an unpatched, end-of-life device exposed to the internet means a very high probability of compromise, and that a factory reset alone is insufficient in that case: it removes the attacker's persistence, but the device stays vulnerable and will certainly be compromised again.
Danfoss said on 13 October that the known affected Danfoss systems were directly exposed to the public internet, without a VPN and not behind a firewall. The equipment involved in the reported incidents was AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 systems, and AK-SM800A systems running outdated software versions. Danfoss's mandatory requirements state that a System Manager must not be connected directly to the public internet and that remote access must go through a secure VPN behind a deny-by-default firewall; they record that the AK-SC355 was retired from sales in 2016 and the AK-SM800 in 2023, while the AK-SM800A is actively sold and supported. Danfoss's advisory DSA-2026-12-02, listed on its security advisories page, concerns the exploitation of weak or known passwords in the AK-SC 355 and AK-SM 800 series; its mitigations are to remove internet exposure, use a VPN and set strong, unique passwords. The listing does not refer to the French incident.
Copeland Controls, in a bulletin of 14 October on its XWEB supervisors (Dixell brand), acknowledged "the vulnerability identified in a discontinued, end-of-life generation of XWEB EVO controllers". It said XWEB EVO has reached end of service and no longer receives security patches, that XWEB PRO is the supported platform, and that neither should be exposed to the internet.
What is confirmed and what is not
Confirmed by officials: the date of the attack; the scale of about 700 sites; that defrost parameters were changed; the losses of goods and the fires; and France's attribution. Danfoss said that, at the time of its notice, the incidents known to it had been reported in France.
Not established in the primary sources: the full number of sites outside France. The Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium warned organisations on 13 October to audit the same systems and report compromises, and Danfoss's installer guide refers to "the cyber incident in Europe". AEF Info reported that about a dozen other European countries had also been affected by attacks on refrigeration systems, some in early November; no official tally has been published.
The official response
CERT-FR's alert, updated on 13 and 16 October, sets out the steps for operators. Remove internet exposure from the affected units and from all units on a public IP address, after checking insurance conditions before cutting data reporting to the refrigeration service provider. Check the whole configuration, especially defrost ranges; for compromised Danfoss equipment, restart it or else restore it to factory settings, then reconfigure it. Restore access only through a secure VPN or a protected network; filtering the provider's source IP addresses on a firewall is acceptable only as an emergency measure. Apply the manufacturer's recommendations, for Danfoss equipment including firmware updates, the Strict security level and changed default passwords.
The vendors gave matching instructions. Danfoss's installer guide sets out six steps: identify the installed product, protect it immediately, recover from a trusted backup, update supported systems, restore remote access through a VPN, and document and escalate; it recommends migrating end-of-life systems to the AK-SM800A. Copeland asks customers to remove every XWEB EVO from the public internet (no port forwarding, no DMZ, no public IP address), to check and restore units from the local network, including users, passwords and defrost parameters, to check product temperatures at the cases if unauthorised access is suspected, and to plan migration.
On 9 November France attributed the attack. According to the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the C4 (ANSSI, COMCYBER, DGA, DGSE and DGSI) attributes it to the Shahid Kaveh unit of the IRGC's electronic and cyber centre. The C4 report cites infrastructure also used to reconnoitre industrial equipment, the scanning tool used, the claim of the attack by a propaganda outlet associated with the unit from 13 October, and traces of Farsi in the attack infrastructure. The ministry said France would summon Iran's ambassador and propose EU sanctions. The Paris prosecutor's office opened a judicial investigation, including for attacks on automated data processing systems and damage by dangerous means, aggravated by the aim of serving a foreign power, which it named as Iran; the investigation is led by the anti-cybercrime office OFAC and the DGSI.
What it means
- No management interface on the open internet. Every official and vendor account turns on equipment reachable directly from the internet. Operators should keep an inventory of what is exposed, remove public access, and allow remote access only through a VPN behind a deny-by-default firewall. See Knowlcom's cybersecurity audit and zero-trust architecture work.
- Refrigeration controllers are control systems. Here a change of setpoint had physical effects: lost goods and fires. Danfoss's best practices call for the control network to be segmented and isolated from corporate and guest networks, and such equipment belongs in the same governance as other operational technology; see IT/OT convergence and ISA/IEC 62443 for industrial and energy systems.
- End-of-life equipment needs a plan, not a reset. CERT-FR warns that an exposed, unpatched end-of-life device will be compromised again after a factory reset. Asset registers should record support status, and replacement should be planned before support ends; trusted configuration backups make recovery possible, as in ransomware and restore discipline in industrial operations.
- Protect the alarms and the third-party access. According to the prosecutor, the attackers disabled the temperature alerts that should have revealed the change, and CERT-FR's guidance addresses remote access and data reporting by refrigeration service providers. Independent checks on critical values, alert integrity, strong unique credentials and controlled provider access belong in incident readiness planning, together with clear incident reporting to the national authority.
The investigation is continuing. This article will be updated if the French authorities or the manufacturers publish further findings.
Sources
- CERT-FR, CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, Incident de sécurité ciblant les contrôleurs à distance des installations de réfrigération (12 October 2026, updated 16 October 2026)
- CERT-FR, CERTFR-2026-CTI-009, Activités cyber offensives ciblant la France menées par des acteurs iraniens liés au CGRI (9 November 2026)
- Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Déclaration d'attribution à l'Iran de cyberattaques visant la France (9 November 2026)
- Danfoss, AK-System Manager – cybersecurity incident France – customer information (13 October 2026; copy published by a distributor)
- Danfoss, AK-System Manager cybersecurity: mandatory requirements and recommended best practices
- Danfoss, Installer guide following the cyber incident in Europe (updated 2 November 2026)
- Danfoss, Security advisories (DSA-2026-12-02, updated 20 November 2026)
- Copeland Controls, Bulletin produit: avis de sécurité relatif aux systèmes de supervision XWEB (14 October 2026)
- Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium, Warning: security incidents in France targeting remote controllers of refrigeration installations (13 October 2026)
- AEF Info, Cyberattaque contre des frigos : le parquet de Paris ouvre une information judiciaire contre des acteurs iraniens (9 November 2026)


