Services

Post-quantum cryptography migration consulting.

Knowlcom provides PQC migration consulting for government, defence and enterprise: a cryptographic inventory, risk prioritisation, a roadmap aligned to NIST and India’s DST deadlines, and hybrid deployment with validation.

Key facts

The standards and deadlines that set the pace.

Last updated . Each fact links to its primary source.

  • 13 August 2024. NIST approved its first post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). NIST
  • May 2026. India’s DST task force, constituted under the National Quantum Mission, set full PQC adoption by 31 December 2029 for Critical Information Infrastructure sectors and by 31 December 2033 for other enterprises. DST roadmap
  • 9 July 2025. CERT-In defined a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) and recommended that government, public-sector and essential-services organisations require one in related procurements. CERT-In guidelines
  • 27 October 2026. NIST finalised NIST IR 8547. US federal high-value assets and high-impact systems must migrate by 2030 for key establishment and by 2031 for digital signatures; 2035 is the primary target for federal systems. NIST
  • 2028, 2031, 2035. The UK NCSC sets discovery and an initial plan by 2028, the highest-priority migrations by 2031 and complete migration by 2035. NCSC
  • 21 August 2023. CISA, NSA and NIST advised organisations to establish a quantum-readiness roadmap, prepare a cryptographic inventory and engage their technology vendors on PQC. CISA

How Knowlcom helps

Four workstreams, one migration programme.

Engage one workstream or the whole programme, as a fixed-scope assessment, an advisory retainer, build and transfer, or a forward-deployed team.

01

Cryptographic inventory and discovery

Find every place cryptography is used across applications, networks, PKI, HSMs, endpoints and third-party services, and record it in a machine-readable cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM). Discovery runs on Q-Ready.

Post-quantum security audit

02

Risk prioritisation

Rank systems by quantum exposure, data lifetime and business impact. Data-lifetime analysis surfaces harvest-now, decrypt-later and forge-later exposure, and a crypto-agility scorecard shows how hard each system is to change.

Quantum-exposure register

03

Migration roadmap

A multi-year roadmap and policy set, sequenced against NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 and the Indian 2029 and 2033 milestones, with board and regulator briefing packs and an independent review of vendor proposals.

Advisory and consulting

04

Hybrid deployment and validation

Hybrid and post-quantum key establishment (ML-KEM) in TLS, VPN and messaging; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA signatures for code, documents and PKI; HSM and library upgrades; interoperability and performance testing, runbooks and rollback procedures.

PQC migration and implementation

Talk to an expert

Glossary

Post-quantum terms, defined.

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC)
Public-key algorithms designed to resist attack by both classical and quantum computers, while running on today’s computers and networks.
Quantum-safe
Cryptography expected to remain secure against known quantum attacks. Used in India’s DST roadmap; often used interchangeably with quantum-resistant.
ML-KEM
Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, specified in NIST FIPS 203. It establishes a shared secret key between two parties.
ML-DSA
Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, specified in NIST FIPS 204, for signing and verifying data.
SLH-DSA
Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, specified in NIST FIPS 205. Its security rests on hash functions rather than lattices.
Harvest now, decrypt later
Recording encrypted data today in order to decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. Its counterpart for signatures is trust now, forge later.
Cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC)
A quantum computer able to break widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography.
Cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM)
An inventory of cryptographic assets: algorithms, keys, protocols, certificates and dependencies, as defined in CERT-In’s guidelines.
Hybrid key exchange
Combining a classical algorithm such as X25519 with a post-quantum one such as ML-KEM, so that a session stays protected while either remains unbroken.
Crypto-agility
The ability to change cryptographic algorithms and parameters through configuration, without redesigning the system.
Mosca’s inequality
A timing test recommended in TEC’s migration report: if the years data must stay secure plus the years needed to migrate exceed the years until a capable quantum computer exists, the data is at risk.

Questions

Frequently asked questions

What is PQC migration?

PQC migration is the replacement of quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography, such as RSA, elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and ECDSA, with post-quantum algorithms such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, often through hybrid schemes during the transition. It covers protocols, certificates, keys, hardware security modules, software and suppliers.

What is harvest now, decrypt later?

An adversary records encrypted traffic today and decrypts it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. Recorded data cannot be re-protected, so data that must stay confidential for years is already exposed. NIST and India’s DST task force both cite it as a main reason the transition is urgent.

When must Indian organisations migrate?

India’s DST task force report (May 2026) sets full PQC adoption by 31 December 2029 for Critical Information Infrastructure sectors (government, strategic, defence, power, telecom, transport and BFSI) and by 31 December 2033 for other enterprises. Foundations, including a cryptographic inventory, are due by the end of 2027 and 2028 respectively. Until sector regulators issue guidance, these dates are the national planning baseline. See India’s PQC migration deadlines.

What are ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA?

NIST’s first post-quantum standards, approved on 13 August 2024. ML-KEM (FIPS 203) establishes shared keys; ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) create digital signatures. ML-KEM and ML-DSA are lattice-based; SLH-DSA is hash-based.

Does symmetric encryption need to change too?

Public-key algorithms are the priority, because a cryptographically relevant quantum computer would break them. India’s DST task force also asks organisations to strengthen symmetric protection, for example by moving from AES-128 to AES-256.

How long does a PQC migration take?

It depends on the size of the estate, how many systems hard-code their cryptography, and how much depends on vendors and long-lived devices. An inventory and a first-wave plan come first; PKI, HSMs and key-management systems usually have the longest lead times. Plan backwards from the deadline that applies to you.

How does Knowlcom help with PQC migration?

Through four workstreams: cryptographic inventory and discovery, risk prioritisation, a migration roadmap, and hybrid deployment with validation. Discovery runs on Q-Ready, which audits and plans without changing systems. Talk to an expert.