Q-Cyber Magazine
CERT-In's 2026 framework for space and satellite cybersecurity
CERT-In's February 2026 space and satellite-communication framework extends India's incident-reporting baseline to space systems and sets segment-wise controls for a domain that already supports national security operations.

Satellite communications already support national security operations, disaster management, navigation and remote connectivity. CERT-In's February 2026 framework treats their cybersecurity as a national baseline problem, not a specialist afterthought.
Why the framework exists
The official text is blunt about exposure. Commercial satellite services, ground stations and user terminals have expanded, and with them the complexity of the space cybersecurity ecosystem. The threats it asks stakeholders to plan for are specific: signal jamming, spoofing, unauthorised command uplink, ground-station compromise and firmware manipulation.
Those are not generic information-technology risks. A compromised ground station or an unauthorised command uplink can affect availability and control, not only the confidentiality of a file store. The framework therefore sets segment-wise controls covering authentication, encryption, access control, intrusion detection and secure firmware practice, and it ties incident detection and reporting back to CERT-In's existing directions and sectoral coordination.
Exhibit 1
Scope of CERT-In's 2026 space and SatCom framework
| Dimension | What the framework specifies |
|---|---|
| Issued | February 2026, CERT-In (MeitY) in collaboration with SIA-India |
| Stakeholders | Government agencies, satellite service providers, ground-station operators, terminal-equipment vendors, private space entities |
| Segments | Space segment, ground infrastructure, communication links, user terminals |
| Illustrated threats | Signal jamming, spoofing, unauthorised command uplink, ground-station compromise, firmware manipulation |
| Incident reporting | Within 6 hours of noticing the incident, consistent with the 2022 CERT-In directions |
| Log retention | Minimum rolling 180 days |
| Supply-chain artefacts | Bills of materials as per CERT-In technical guidelines on SBOM, QBOM, CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM |
Source: CERT-In, Cyber Security Framework and Guidelines for Space including Satellite Communication, PDF published at cert-in.org.in; document creation metadata 26 February 2026.
Supply chain is part of the security model
Section 5.8 of the framework is unusually direct for a public guideline. Stakeholders are told to vet vendors and component suppliers, verify hardware provenance, test for firmware tampering, mandate secure update channels, and keep traceability through manufacturing and logistics. They are also told to maintain bills of materials in line with CERT-In's technical guidelines on SBOM and on quantum, cryptographic, AI and hardware bills of materials.
For defence users of satellite services, that list should appear in procurement and in the accreditation of commercial capacity. A leased transponder or a managed ground service is still a command path if it carries operational traffic.
Implications
- Treat SatCom as a reported estate. The six-hour clock and 180-day log apply; points of contact must be current.
- Control every segment, not only the spacecraft. Ground stations, links and terminals are first-class targets in the framework's own threat list.
- Demand provenance. Hardware origin, signed firmware and CERT-In-aligned bills of materials belong in contracts.
- Exercise the plan. The framework calls for crisis plans, business continuity, cyber drills and participation in CERT-In exercises.
What this means for defence
Defence is already a user of the space ecosystem the framework describes. The useful response is to map every operational SatCom path to a named operator, a reporting duty, a firmware-and-supply-chain condition, and a rehearsal schedule. The February 2026 text gives that mapping a public reference.


